

OPINION POLL

A TROUBLED TRANSITION IN THE DR CONGO

APRIL 2017







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INTRODUCTION

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO IS AT A CROSSROADS

Having failed to carry out elections by the end of 2016, as required by the constitution, the government engaged in two separate rounds of negotiations with the opposition, the first facilitated by the first facilitated by former Togolese prime minister Edem Kodjo under the auspices of the African Union and the second brokered by the Catholic Church. The first peace deal, called *l'Accord de la Cité de l'OUA*, produced a power-sharing government between President Joseph Kabila's coalition and part of the opposition led by Vital Kamerhe. On November 17, 2016 Samy Badibanga, a former opposition politician, was named prime minister.


That peace deal excluded much of the opposition. A second round of negotiations led by Congo's National Conference Of Catholic Bishops (CENCO) produced another agreement on December 31, 2016. This Compromise was supposed to have led to the formation of a transitional government, elections by the end of 2017, and reforms within the electoral commission. However, the implementation of the Compromise stalled due to disagreements over the control of the transitional government, most notably the nomination of the prime minister, and the presidency of the oversight mechanism of the agreement, the Conseil National De Suivi de L'Accord et du Processus Électorale (CNSA), both institutions to be

led by the main coalition opposition group, the Rassemblement des forces politiques et sociales acquises au changement, (Rassop).

On February 1, 2017, the veteran opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi passed away, leading to divisions within his UDPS party (l'Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social). On April 7, President Kabila named Bruno Tshibala, the former deputy secretary general of UDPS who had recently fallen out with his party, as prime minister. The Rassemblement, led until his death by Etienne Tshisekedi, denounced what it described as a violation of the New Year's Eve agreement. The governments of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, United States, and the European Union also criticized the nomination.

In February and April 2017, the Congo Research Group (CRG) and the Bureau d'Études, de Recherches, et Consulting International (BERCI) conducted two nationally representative polls to assess Congolese public opinion in light of these events. We also asked the public's opinion of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO), whose mandate was renewed on March 31, 2016, despite strong reservations from the Congolese government.

DO YOU HAVE A GOOD OPINION, BAD OPINION, OR NO OPINION AT ALL OF PRESIDENT JOSEPH KABILA? 1



4 LINTRODUCTION

^{1. (*)} Nationwide Surveys; (**) Surveys conducted in the capital cities of the eleven provinces, all the other polls were conducted in Kinshasa. In May 2016 the question was addressed the following way: «Soutenez-vous fortement, moyennement, ou pas du tout, la manière dont le Président Kabila gère son travail en tant que Président de la République? - "Fortemement" and "moyennement" are considered « good opinion » and « pas du tout is considered « pad ».

KEY FINDINGS

THE POLL SUPPORTS THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS

■ The general political mood in the country is gloomy, with a majority expecting further political impasse and strife in the near future. In February 2017, a clear majority of Congolese believed that Kabila should have resigned on December 19, 2016 and supports the New Year's Eve Compromise. For most respondents, the political deal will be respected, despite the fact that Kabila's majorité présidentielle coalition is perceived as responsible for the current political impasse. Nonetheless, the Congolese public is evenly divided about the nomination of Bruno Tshibala as prime minister.





■ Moïse Katumbi continues to be the most popular opposition politician since May 2016. However, Katumbi is still in exile, and no opposition politician has emerged to fill the void left by Etienne Tshisekedi. And, if free legislative elections were held in February, more traditional opposition parties--the UDPS, MLC, and UNC--would dominate a fragmented parliament.



The general political mood in the country is gloomy, with a majority expecting further political impasse and strife in the near future

Regarding peacebuilding and statebuilding, an overwhelming majority of the general population in April 2017 supported the renewal of the MONUSCO mandate. Moreover, the majority of the respondents declared having participated to the ongoing voters' registration, in line with the part of the country covered to date by the registration operations.




DO YOU THINK THAT PRESIDENT KABILA SHOULD HAVE STEPPED DOWN ON DECEMBER 19, 2016?2


DO YOU SUPPORT THE NOMINATION

OF BRUNO TSHIBALA AS PRIME

MINISTER ON APRIL 7, 2016?3


DO YOU SUPPORT THE DECEMBER 31, 2016 POLITICAL COMPROMISE **BROKERED BY CENCO?**







WE KNOW THAT NOT ALL POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE DECLARED THEIR CANDIDACY YET, BUT IF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WERE HELD NEXT SUNDAY, WHO WOULD YOU VOTE FOR?⁴



^{2.} February 19 - 28, opinion poll 3. April 9-10, opinion poll 4. February 19-28, 2017

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GENERAL POLITICAL SENTIMENT

CRITICAL PUBLIC OPINION



77% of the respondents believe that the country is headed in the wrong direction, while President Kabila's approval rating was at its lowest level recorded yet, with 24%.


February poll

Two months after the end of President Joseph Kabila's second and last constitutional mandate, most respondents had a gloomy view of the future, with 77% saying that the country was headed in the wrong direction. This somber perspective is echoed by many political analysts. For some, credible elections and political stability in the Democratic Republic of

Congo (DRC) appear more elusive than ever.5 And for others, President Kabila maneuvers to delay the elections could lay the groundwork for renewed civil unrest led by frustrated political opponents-at potentially catastrophic cost.6 Indeed, 53% of respondent in our February poll were thought that in the next 3 months there will be more social conflicts. Moreover, in our Mid-2016 poll, when asked the respondents whether they would participate in a demonstration if elections are either rigged or delayed or both, 48.5% said they would, giving us an indication of people's acceptability of such contestation. This has had an impact on President Kabila's approval rating, which is at his lowest level yet, with only 24% of respondents saying the had a good opinion of him. Moreover, 69% of the respondents stated in February that President Joseph Kabila should have stepped down on December 19, 2016, as required by the constitution. It is interesting to note, however, that in our mid-2016 survey, 74.3% of the general population surveyed believed that Kabila should leave office at the end of 2016. These results seem to indicate that Kabila's "glissement" strategy is slowly but surely gaining ground.

?

DO YOU THINK THAT IN THE UPCOMING 2 TO 3 MONTHS, THERE WILL BE MORE SOCIAL CONFLICTS?



NO

I DON'T KNOW


YES

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9 | GENERAL POLITICAL SENTIMENT

^{5.} Stephanie Wolters, South Africa Institute of Security Studies (ISS), April 19, 2017. 6.Pierre Englebert, Congo Blues, Atlantic Council, Issue Brief, May 2016.


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
DO YOU THINK THAT KABILA SHOULD HAVE STEPPED DOWN ON 19 DECEMBER 2017?⁷ (THOSE WHO ANSWERED 'YES')



^{7.} February poll 2017.

HAVE YOU EXPERIENCED SOME UNRESTS OR VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD ON DECEMBER 19 TO 20, 2016?⁷





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February 2017 poll

The day following the endorsement of the October 18 Deal, a general strike was launched in Kinshasa and the opposition vowed to "organize popular protests on the 19th of every month until Kabila stepped down". On 17 November, Samy Badibanga was named as prime minister, replacing Matata Mponyo who resigned three days before, in conformity with article 17 of the October Deal that required that the prime minister came from the opposition. The former parliamentarian led dissidents UDPS delegates who were expelled from their party in 2011 after refusing to boycott parliament, as demanded by their party. Badibanga has since then been considered to be on the fringes of the opposition by the main opposition coalition.9


In our February political poll, 62% of respondents stated that they have experienced some unrests or violent incidents in the neighborhood on the night of December 19, 2016. According to the poll, on 19 December, the last day of President Kabila second and last constitutional mandate, in Kinshasa, and other major cities people stayed at homes while large numbers of police and military were deployed in the cities. The United Nations reported that at least 40 persons were killed during protests on 19 December, 107 have been injured and that 460 opposition activists were arrested.8



In general, public opinion is critical of the government of Samy Badibanga, who resigned on April 6, 2017. The February survey results, also, indicate that only 21% have a favorable opinion of him, and a large majority of respondents (70%) did not approve his nomination in the first place. One of several factors contributing to the former prime minister's lack of popularity was the way he ignored the crisis in Kasai Central during his mandate. Although originally from Kasai Central, Badibanga, never met with the protagonists of the crisis there during his tenure, in Kinshasa or the provincial capital Kananga. In late January, militia incursions in Kananga prompted him to abandon several attempts to visit the area. Moreover, although a parliamentary question about the situation was tabled in December 2016, the provincial assembly has not yet visited the affected areas, citing a lack of resources. 10



SAMY BADIBANGA, GOOD OR BAD OPINION IN SELECTED PROVINCES?¹¹



8. United Nations Human Right High Commissioner report
9. UDPS believed that his leader Etienne Tshisekedi had won the 2011 presidential Elections.
10. Hans Hoebeke, Kamuina Nsapu Insurgency Adds to Dangers in DR Congo, International Crisis Group (ICG), 21 March 2017.

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^{11.} February poll 2017.












More than 1,2 million people have been displaced in the Kasais, including 600,000 children, since the crisis began in August 2016.

United Nations

The Kamuina Nsapu conflict in the Kasais has had considerable humanitarian, political, and regional consequences. According to the United Nations, more than 1,2 million people have been displaced in the Kasais, including 600,000 children, since the crisis began in August 2016. This population displacement could increase food insecurity, if the affected communities are not able to prepare the next planting season. According to UN investigators, 17 mass graves have been discovered recently in the Kasai region, bringing the number of such sites recorded by UN investigators to 40, prompting the world body's top human rights official to

raise the prospect of action by the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the political level, in conflict-affected areas of the Kasai provinces, voter registration offices have been destroyed, and several cases of stolen equipment have been reported. On 21 April, 2017, the Independent Electoral Commission announced that voter registration will not be launched in the Kasai region, following the assassination of an election official in the region. If the situation persists there may be little registration at all in Kasai and Kasai Central provinces, leaving this proopposition region with little representation at the national and local level.


DO YOU HAVE A GOOD OR BAD OPINION OF THE FOLLOWING YOUTH MOVEMENTS?



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POLITICAL PROCESS

STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE NEW YEAR'S EVE COMPROMISE



Negotiations among the political elite have been a regular fixture since President Kabila 's reelection in 2011. There has been three major rounds of negociations between the ruling coalition and the opposition: the concertations nationales in 2013, the dialogue that resulted in the Accord de la Cité de l'OUA on October 2016, and the Compromis de la Saint-Sylvestre of December 31, 2016. The last deal, brokered by CENCO on New Year's Eve, finally produced an agreement between the ruling coalition and the main opposition parties that had been elusive during the previous rounds of negotiations.


In our February survey, respondents clearly backed (83%) the New Year's Eve compromise brokered by the Catholic Church. The church itself was viewed favorably by 83% of those polled, as well as the Rassemblement (75%). From the onset, the implementation of the deal faced serious challenges, centered on a

disagreement over how to nominate the prime minister and the structure of the upcoming government. Within a few days of the signing of the agreement, some members of the ruling coalition were talking about having the agreement revised by the constitutional court. In our February survey when asked who was responsible for the current political impasse, those polled placed the blame largely on Kabila's coalition (72%), although a sizeable minority (27%) blamed the main opposition coalition, the "Rassemblement".

Etienne Tshisekedi's death on February 1, 2017 further stalled the implementation of the New Year's Eve Compromise, and led to divisions within the leadership of the opposition coalition. It is currently split into three wings: the first led by Felix Tshisekedi and Moïse Katumbi (courant Limeté), a second by Joseph Olengakov and Bruno Tshibala wing, and a third by Jean-Pierre Lisanga Bonganga. Our February survey, indicates that in the majority of our respondents (47%) felt that Tshisekedi's death could compromise the implementation of the agreement (vs 36% who did not think so and 14% that did not know). The Catholic bishops ended their mediation on March 27, 2017 after the Rassemblement and Kabila's political alliance failed to resolve their differences and sign an implmentation agreement before the deadline a day before.

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
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DELAYED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECEMBER 31, 2016 ACCORD?



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
THE HIGHLIGHTS

OF THE DECEMBER 31, 2016 COMPROMISE



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OVERALL, WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE FOLLOWING STAKEHOLDERS?



18 | THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Congolese public opinion is evenly divided when it comes to Kabila's controversial nomination of Bruno Tshibala as prime minister. About half of the respondents (51%) view his nomination favorably.

As indicated above, On April 7, President Joseph Kabila named Bruno Tshibala the prime minister of a new transitional government in replacement of Samy Badibanga, who resigned the day before. His nommination stirred controversy. Bruno Tshibala was excluded from UDPS and The Rassemblement on March 4, 2017, after he contested Félix Tshisekedi as the successor to his father. He later joined Joseph Olengankoy who was heading a dissidence wing of opposition coalition.



Our April survey indicates that, Congolese public opinion is evenly divided when it comes to Tshibala's nomination as prime minister. About half of the respondents (51%) view his nomination favorably, with the other half (49%) seeing it unfavorably. There are various interpretations for why Tshibala is significantly more popular than either Badibanga or Kabila: he could be perceived by some as the legitimate heir to Etienne Tshisekedi, having been a leader of the UDPS for more than 30 years. Alternatively, there are indications that the population is exasperated by the political elite and decided to give him a chance in order to move toward elections.



WHO IS BRUNO TSHIBALA?

Originally from Kasai Oriental, Bruno Tshibala is a longstanding leader of the UDPS which was created on February 15 1982. While records show that is not a signatory of the party's charter, he was present during the inception of the movement. Born in 1956, he began his political career while still a student in April 1980 by joining a leftist party, along with Tshisekedi. Member of the first executive board of the movement, he became its first itinerant Ambassador. In the late eighties, he was named Inspector at the Portfolio Ministry and also worked as an independent expert for UNDP and UNIDO. In the nineties, he was part of steering committee of the Conference National Souveraine (CNS) and became the President of the famous commission des biens mal-acquis. After Etienne Tshisekedi's election as a prime minister at the CNS, Bruno Tshibala became the legal advisor of the finance Cabinet of the Prime Minister office. Holder of a public law degree from Marien Ngouabi University of Congo Brazzaville, he is an attorney at law of the Bandundu Bar, since 2004. Up until the death of Etienne Tshisekedi, he was the party's deputy secretary general and the spokesperson of the Rassop. On 9 October 2016, he was arrested at Kinshasa International Airport when he was about to board a plane to Brussels and was held at Makala Central Prison until November 29. 2016, accused of organizing demonstrations that led to the deaths of several dozen protesters and some policemen. It is believed that he was President Kabila's first choice for prime minister for the implementation of the October 18 Agreement, but he declined the position out of loyalty to Etienne Tshisekedi, and the position was soon thereafter accepted by Samy Badibanga.

« Cette décision qui n'a rien à voir, ni avec l'accord, ni avec le Rassemblement, est une conséquence des tripatouillages du pouvoir en place, organisés autour d'individus instrumentalisés par celui-ci, au service de ses seuls intérêts pour s'en servir ensuite comme faire-valoir fictif d'un pseudo rassemblement sorti droit du palais de la Nation ».

Félix Tshisekedi, (RFI)





« LA CENCO déplore que les concertations entre le Chef de l'Etat et le Chef de la délégation du Rassemblement au terme desquelles allait être nommé le Premier Ministre n'aient pas eu lieu. Malgré tout, Un premier Ministre a été nommé. Ceci constitue une entorse à l'Accord de la Saint Sylvestre et explique la persistance de la Crise »

Communiqué de presse CENCO



« M. Kabila n'avait pas le droit de nommer le Premier ministre avant la signature de l'arrangement particulier qui devait fixer les modalités de l'application de l'accord [du Centre interdiocésain ».

Moïse Katumbi, Radio OKAPI



« La mission de la Cenco a pris fin et à cette occasion ils avaient constaté une sorte d'impasse concernant le mode de désignation du Premier ministre et ils avaient demandé au président de la République de s'assumer. »

Aubin Minaku, Secrétaire général de la majorité présidentielle (RFI)



« Les acteurs politiques de la Majorité Présidentielle qui ont donnés de la voix après la déclaration de la Cenco ne doivent pas oublier qu'il n'y a pas de meilleure interprétation de l'accord que celle faite par les prélats catholiques d'autant plus qu'ils étaient au centre des négociations. »

ASADHO, Africa 243



« Depuis un certain moment, le gouvernement belge s'est illustré à maintes reprises par une immixtion intolérable dans les affaires intérieures de la RDC, à travers des déclarations insupportables. Nous ne pouvons pas comprendre que lorsqu'on nomme un ministre ou un Premier ministre de la RDC, que le gouvernement belge se mette à se prononcer là-dessus. Nous allons prévenir la Belgique que ce n'est pas de cette manière que nous pouvons coopérer. Nous devons nous respecter mutuellement. Et dans le cas contraire on se sépare.

C'est comme ça que nous allons prendre la mesure de suspendre la coopération dans le secteur de l'armée

Le reste va suivre si ça se poursuit ainsi ».

Crispin Atama, Ministre congolais de la Défense (RFI)



« Il est peut-être temps que les Congolais arrêtent de donner l'impression qu'il y a la politique et qu'il y a les Congolais. Le plus important pour nous tous, ce sont les Congolais qui traversent une période économique difficile, comme tout le monde le sait, et d'ailleurs nous devons tous nous mettre ensemble pour trouver des solutions avec les institutions financières internationales, avec les partenaires internationaux ».


Maman Sidikou, RSSG des Nations unies en RDC (RFI)

20 | THE POLITICAL PROCESS

OVERALL, WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE FOLLOWING POLITICAL LEADERS?

Compared to President Kabila, and the ruling majority, opposition leaders' opinion, fare much better, in the February poll. of Moïse Katumbi and 85% feel the same was conducted after his death). Since the last CRG/BERCI poll in mid-2016, points since his death.


Katumbi's approval rating has risen by 7%. However, only 55% have a good opinion of his son Felix Tshisekedi, who has been named Eighty-one percent have a good opinion as the new leader of the UDPS, leading to divisions within the party. It is interesting way about Etienne Tshisekedi (the poll to note that Etienne Tshisekedi 's favorable opinion have increased 30 percentage



ACCORDING TO YOU, WHO COULD REPLACE ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI AT THE PRESIDENCY OF THE NEW YEAR'S EVE OVERSIGHT MECHANISM (CNSA)?



After the New Year's Eve Compromise, all parties had agreed that Etienne Tshisekedi should be the head of the deal's oversight mechanism (CNSA). When asked who should replace Tshisekedi, most respondents cited Moïse Katumbi (33%), followed by the Catholic Church (16%), Felix Tshisekedi (8%), Valentin Mubake (8%), Vital Kamerhe (4%), and Eve Bazaïba (4%). A cross-tabulation of these results with data regarding preferences for political parties suggest that it is mostly UDPS voters (43%), independent voters (17%), MLC voters (14%), followed by MSR/Pierre Lumbi (5%) that would like to see Moïse Katumbi become the President of the Oversight mechanism. However, Katumbi return to DRC has not been settled yet, despite CENCO recommendations to President Kabila.



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ELECTORAL PROCESS

THERE IS LITTLE FAITH IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS


Regarding the electoral process, 59% of respondents indicated that had registered to vote in the coming elections by April 7, 2017. These results are heartening to the extent that they broadly correspond with the progress of the electoral commission, which has covered 19 of the 26 provinces-registration has yet to be carried out in Kwilu, Kwango, Maï-Ndombe, Kongo Central and Kinshasa, representing almost 41% of the population (notwithstanding the delay in two kasai provinces). Furthermore, the poll indicates that 79% of the respondents who

have not yet registered intend to do so, while 10% have decided against it and 11% are still undecided. As was the case in the last CRG/BERCI survey in mid-2016, respondents' faith in the democratic process is modest, and their trust in Election Commissioner Corneille Nangaa is almost unchanged (29% had a good opinion of him in mid-2016, compared with 30% in February 2017), while their distrust has increased considerably (38% had a poor opinion of him in mid-2016, compared with 54% in February 2017).




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OVERALL, WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF CORNEILLE NANGAA (PRESIDENT OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION)?




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IF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD NEXT SUNDAY, WHOM WOULD YOU VOTE?



IF THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WERE HELD NEXT SUNDAY, FOR WHICH POLITICAL PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE?



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
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IF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD NEXT SUNDAY, FOR WHOM WOULD YOU VOTE? (PREFERRED CANDIDATE BY PROVINCE)



| Province | A. Muzitu | E. Bazaïba | F. Tshisekedi | J. Kabila | Jp Bemba | M. Katumbi | O. Kamitatu | No One/Do Not Know | V. Kamerhe | Others |
|----------------|-----------|------------|---------------|-----------|----------|------------|----------------------------|--------------------|------------|--------|
| Tshuapa | | | | | 50% | 50% | | | | 0% |
| Tshopo | 2% | 6% | | 15% | 2% | 30% | | 19% | 6% | 22% |
| Tanganika | 8% | | | 4% | 4% | 29% | | 4% | | 50% |
| Sud Ubangi | | 40% | | 20% | 40% | | | | | 0% |
| Sud Kivu | 1% | 3% | | 9% | 1% | 43% | 2% | 16% | 9% | 18% |
| Sankuru | | | | | | 0% | 6 6 6 | 100% | | 0% |
| Nord Ubangi | | | | | 11% | 22% | 6 6 8 8 | | | 67% |
| Nord Kivu | 1% | 1% | | 11% | 1% | 42% | 1% | 10% | 13% | 20% |
| Mongala | | | | | | 50% | 17% | 33% | | 0% |
| Maniema | | | | 27% | 2% | 49% | £ | 4% | 2% | 16% |
| Maindombe | 16% | 4% | 4% | 20% | 8% | 20% | | | 4% | 24% |
| Lualaba | | | 9% | 18% | | 55% | | 18% | | 0% |
| Lomami | 2% | | 11% | 3% | | 43% | 2 2 3 4 4 5 | 18% | 2% | 22% |
| Kwilu | 14% | | | 7% | 7% | 17% | 10% | 7% | 3% | 35% |
| Kwanga | 13% | | 3% | | 7% | 27% | 20% | 7% | | 23% |
| Kinshasa | 7% | 4% | 1% | 11% | 5% | 33% | 1% | 10% | 3% | 24% |
| Kasai Oriental | 1% | 3% | 28% | 5% | | 34% | | 15% | 1% | 13% |
| Kasai Central | 1% | 1% | 22% | 1% | - | 41% | | 19% | 4% | 10% |
| Kasai | | | 14% | 5% | | 29% | * | 24% | | 29% |
| Ituri | | 6% | | | 6% | 50% | | | 6% | 33% |
| Haut Uele | 7% | 2% | 2% | 11% | 4% | 29% | - | 20% | 7% | 18% |
| Haut Lomami | | | | 11% | | 68% | | | | 21% |
| Haut Katanga | | | | 14% | | 51% | 6 6 8 8 | 11% | 8% | 16% |
| Equateur | | 3% | | 10% | 33% | 23% | 5% | 5% | | 21% |
| Kongo Central | | | 6% | 6% | 18% | 24% | * | 18% | 10% | 20% |
| Bas Uele | | 8% | | 17% | | 25% | 8% | 42% | | 0% |

IF THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WERE HELD NEXT SUNDAY, FOR WHICH POLITICAL PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE? (PREFERRED PARTY BY PROVINCE)



| | | | | | | | | | | | Į. |
|----------------|--------------|--------------------|-----|------------------|-------------|------|------|------|-----------------------|-----|--------|
| Province | ARC/Kamitatu | No one/Independent | MLC | MSR/Pierre Lumbi | Do not know | PALU | PPRD | UDPS | UFC | UNC | Others |
| Tshuapa | | | 25% | | | | 50% | | | | 25% |
| Tshopo | 2% | 20% | 20% | | 2% | 2% | 22% | 14% | 6% | 6% | 6% |
| Tanganyka | | 17% | 8% | 25% | 17% | 17% | 8% | 8% | • | | 0% |
| Sud Ubangi | | | 80% | | | | | | | | 20% |
| Sud Kivu | 3% | 21% | 7% | 1% | 15% | 3% | 11% | 20% | 2 0 0 0 0 | 13% | 6% |
| Sankuru | | | | | | | | 100% | | | 0% |
| Nord Ubangi | | | 33% | | | | | | 67% | | 0% |
| Nord Kivu | 1% | 17% | 7% | 3% | 7% | 1% | 17% | 23% | | 16% | 8% |
| Mongala | 25% | | 25% | | 50% | | | | | | 0% |
| Maniema | | 16% | 5% | 14% | 2% | | 39% | 20% | | 2% | 2% |
| Maindombe | | 20% | 12% | | 4% | 20% | 4% | 12% | 4% | 4% | 20% |
| Lualaba | | 18% | | 9% | 9% | | 18% | 45% | | | 0% |
| Lomami | 3% | 8% | | 3% | 19% | 2% | 13% | 41% | | 2% | 10% |
| Kwilu | 15% | 2% | 11% | | 4% | 38% | 16% | 10% | | 4% | 1% |
| Kwango | 21% | | 7% | | 11% | 25% | | 29% | | | 7% |
| Kinshasa | 1% | 13% | 22% | 2% | | 11% | 11% | 26% | 2% | 3% | 7% |
| Kasai Oriental | 8% | 4% | 1% | | 5% | | 8% | 68% | 4% | 3% | 0% |
| Kasai Central | 3% | 3% | 4% | | 13% | 1% | 9% | 62% | | 4% | 0% |
| Kasai | | | | | | | 5% | 95% | | | 0% |
| Ituri | | | 38% | | 13% | | | 31% | | 6% | 13% |
| Haut Uele | | 20% | 13% | 11% | 22% | 2% | 2% | 7% | 2% | 16% | 4% |
| Haut Lomami | | 8% | 4% | 13% | 8% | | 8% | 50% | • | | 8% |
| Haut Katanga | 5% | 13% | | 11% | 27% | | 10% | 11% | 2% | 6% | 15% |
| Equateur | 5% | 16% | 58% | | 5% | | 16% | | : | | 0% |
| Kongo Central | | 10% | 18% | 2% | 4% | | 6% | 39% | : | 10% | 12% |
| Bas Uele | | 9% | | | 18% | | 36% | 36% | * | | 0% |

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
The electoral field remains extremely fragmented. When asked for whom they would vote if elections were held next Sunday, respondents chose Moïse Katumbi (38%) over Joseph Kabila (10%), Felix Tshisekedi (5%), Vital Kamerhe (5%), and Jean-Pierre Bemba (5%). This compared with their support in a CRG/BERCI poll in mid-2016: Katumbi (33%), Etienne Tshisekedi (18%), Joseph Kabila (7,8%), and Vital Kamerhe (7,5%). It is important to highlight that Congolese presidential elections are decided after one round of voting and the winner only needs a plurality of votes.

Three main conclusions stand out in terms of political preferences, besides Katumbi's popularity.

■ First, it is clear that Etienne Tshisekedi's supporters have not coalesced behind

- another candidate. When voters who had wanted to vote for him were asked who they would chose instead, 24% said Katumbi, 12% said Felix Tshisekedi, and 50% said no other candidate.
- Second, if Moïse Katumbi is unable to return for elections, the field of candidates will be wide open.
- Lastly, while Katumbi is clearly the frontrunner in the presidential race, the government is formed out of the majority in parliament. The UDPS, Etienne Tshisekedi's former party, was in the lead (27%), with more established parties such as Bemba's MLC (11%) and Kamerhe's UNC (6%) coming before the Katumbi's G7 coalition. Altogether, parties close currently allied to Kabila garnered 18% support from respondents.

THERE ARE TWO DIVERGENT POINTS OF VIEW REGARDING THE REPATRIATION OF ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI'S BODY IN KINSHASA, WITH WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS DO YOU AGREE WITH?




The government should pay for all funeral expenses, since he was a former prime minister. He deserves to be buried by the government

I support the view of his biological and political families (UDPS and RASSOP): a prime minister from the Rassemblement needs to be nominated first, and a mausoleum should be built in his honor in the place of their choice

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TSHISEKEDI'S VOTERS PREFERENCES IN FEBRUARY 2017



REASONS GIVEN BY TSHISEKEDI VOTERS FOR THEIR CHOICE SUBSTITUTE OR LACK OF IT



INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

THE DONOR COMMUNITY CONTINUES TO BE PERCEIVED FAVORABLY BY CONGOLESE PUBLIC OPINION



Most respondents of the February poll stated that the United States (84%), France (82%), Belgium (82%) and the United Kingdom (75%), played a positive role in the New Year's Eve *Compromise*. Moreover, seventy-two percent of respondents said the targeted sanctions imposed in 2016 by the United States and the European Union were a positive development. However, African countries' involvement in the peace process

is not perceived as favorable by Congolese, with 50% approval for South Africa, 43% for Angola, for Congo-Brazzaville (34%), and almost none for Rwanda (6%) and Uganda (6%). The divide between western donors and African countries has widened since the last CRG/BERCI poll. When people were asked mid-2016 which countries played a positive role in the Congo in general, the United States came first with 73,3%, followed



Most respondents of the February poll stated that the United States (84%), France (82%), Belgium (82%) and the United Kingdom (75%), played a positive role in the New Year's Eve deal.

by France (71,1%), Belgium (67,4%), China (65,4%) and the United Kingdom (65,1%). While 61,4% thought South Africa was playing a positive role, the figures were lower for Angola (49,5%), the Republic of Congo (35,7%), Uganda (15,4%), and Rwanda (10,7%).

On March 31, the United Nations Security Council renewed the mandate of MONUSCO for a year, despite some strong reservations from the Congolese government. This decision seems to be greatly appreciated by the general population with 71% of respondents stating that it was a positive development. It appears that public opinion toward MONUSCO has softened in recent months, as the political climate has deteriorated: in 2016 only 55% of those polled thought that MONUSCO should stay.

By unanimously adopting the resolution extending MONUSCO's mandate, the 15-member Council decided that:

- MONUSCO would comprise 16,215 military personnel — down from 19,815 under its previous mandate — as well as 391 police and 1,050 formed police units;
- The number of MONUSCO's military observers will be reduced from 760 to 660;
- The Secretary-General will conduct

a strategic review of MONUSCO and examine the continued relevance of its mandated tasks, in order to provide advice on a further trooplevel reduction, as well as an exit strategy.

For some observers, the military personnel reduction is considered, as purely «theoretical» since in practice, less than 500 peacekeepers will have to leave the mission. Indeed, the United Nations security forces never worked at full capacity and were, in «reality», composed of some 3,100 fewer staff than its capacity allowed.¹²

The Security Council resolution also «called on all stakeholders in the DRC, including President Joseph Kabila, the presidential majority and the opposition, to swiftly implement the political agreement signed on 31 December 2016, urging the Government and all relevant parties to ensure an environment conducive to free, fair, credible, inclusive, transparent and timely presidential and legislative elections before the end of 2017.»

The UN resolution further «called on the country's Independent National Electoral Commission to publish immediately a revised comprehensive electoral calendar and complete a credible update of the electoral register».

12. Jeune Afrique, RDC: l'ONU renouvelle le mandat de la MONUSCO et modifie le plafond des effectifs, 31 mars 2017.

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URUGUAY'S REPRESENTATIVE

At the United Nations, on 21 March 2016 at the UN Security Council

"It is very difficult to understand the Democratic Republic of the Congo's request to reduce the Mission and present an exit strategy. This is no time for political game-playing. The most pressing task before the United Nations was to support implementation of the transition agreement, to contribute to the holding of elections and the peaceful transfer of power. Conflict had reared its ugly head in several parts of the country, and the Organization had itself been a victim, as seen in the recent abduction of two Security Council experts."



LÉONARD SHE OKITUNDU

Deputy prime minister and Minister of Foreign affairs and Regional Integration Of the Democratic Republic of Congo, on 21 March 2016 at the UN Security Council

"It is unacceptable that MONUSCO was unable to end the crisis in the country, which had lasted several years. Any extension of its mandate must respect the wishes of the Congolese people."

"The Mission is no longer the sole responder to most of the nation's residual security challenges. The national armed forces have undertaken nearly all security response, and we call upon the Council to provide an exit-strategy timeline for MONUSCO.





MONSIGNOR MARCEL UTEMBI TAPA

Archbishop of Kisangani and President of the Episcopal Conference of the Democratic Republic of Congo (CENCO), on 21 March 2016 at the UN Security Council

«The Democratic Republic of Congo is now without any legitimate institution. It is the first time that this has happened in our Country since independence.

Therefore, the agreement of December 31 is the only way out of the crisis. Delaying implementation did nothing to ease political tension in the country, and bloody clashes and violations of human rights remained of great concern. With tensions continuing to simmer, the Catholic Church had itself been targeted by militia accusing it of not doing enough to help implementation of the 31 December agreement."





MAMAN SIDIKOU

Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), on 21 March 2016 at the UN Security Council

"Delayed implementation of the "comprehensive and inclusive political agreement", signed in Kinshasa on 31 December 2016, is prolonging the current political uncertainty... The spread of violence had been characterized by a significant increase in human rights abuses, with 2016 having witnessed a 30 per cent increase in such violations compared to 2015."

"The 31 December agreement provided a clear path towards elections, setting the stage for MONUSCO's drawdown and exit. In that regard, the Mission's main strategic objective would be to support the establishment of an environment conducive to the timely holding of peaceful, credible and inclusive elections, in accordance with the agreement's provisions. Accordingly, MONUSCO had already adjusted its posture and operations, provided support for updating the voter register, and strengthened its civilian and military presence and operations in new areas of concern."



MARIE-MADELEINE KALALA

Common Cause Network (Civil Society), on 21 March 2016 at the UN Security Council

"Citizens no longer have trust in State institutions. Political dialogue is the only way to settle this crisis(...) The population's long suffering is no longer acceptable, and political actors must honour their commitments. No electoral calendar had been published yet, while it is the responsibility of State institutions to prepare the elections."

"The international community had remained silent amid the murders and killings taking place in Beni. "Je suis Beni" had not had the same impact as "Je suis Paris" or "Je suis Munich"."





U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATES

Press Release

"The United States is disappointed by lack of progress in implementation of the December 31 Saint-Sylvestre Political Agreement (...) The formation of a new government, as prescribed by the agreement, would pave the way for elections and the DRC's first peaceful, democratic transfer of power through the expressed will of the Congolese people."

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METHODOLOGY

CRG/BERCI POLLS







FIELDWORK DATES



FEBRUARY 19 TO 28 AND APRIL 9 TO 10, 2017

1024 1277

respondents in 2017

± 3%

margin of error

18+

Congolese adults

The poll consisted of telephone interviews with 1,024 respondents in February 2017 and 1277 in April 2017. The respondents were randomly selected from a list of phone numbers produced by a face-to-face poll published by CRG and BERCI in October 2016. That poll also provided socio-economic information about the respondents—their class, education levels, geographic locations, and age—that allowed us to weight the phone surveys to correct for any bias. The margin of error is estimated at being around 3%.



POPULATION EFFECTIVELY SAMPLED

We selected at random among respondents in the mid- 2016 face to face survey, all of whom were Congoloses adults over the age of 18.



INTERVIEW METHOD

Phone interviews were conducted on electronic tablets using Open Data Kit (ODK) and uploaded directly to a cloud-based server hosted by Ona. io. Quality assurance was conducted in real-time as the surveys were uploaded, and feedback was provided to the teams on a regular basis. Enumerators were monitored for rushing, skipped questions, and other quality indicators.



DATA WEIGHTING

In both phone surveys, data were weighted by sex, age, education and province according to the face-to-face representative survey. Targets for the weighted data in the face-to-survey were derived from the DHS survey, a random probability survey comprising more than 10,000 random face-to-face interviews conducted every five 5 years.



CURRENT ADJUSTMENT PROCESS REALLOCATION

Voters who had, spontaneouly chosen «Etienne Tshisekedi» as their preferred choice for Presidential candidate, despite his death were probed further to modify their responses accordingly.



SAMPLING METHOD

A nationally representative sample was selected at random from the face-to face panel of 7500+ adults, with sample selected in proportion to population distribution. Sample size: 1983 valid phone numbers provided by respondents of the face to face mid-2016 survey. The response rate was around 52% in the February survey for a total of 1024 respondents, while the response rate was around 64% for the April survey for a total sample of 1277 respondents.



VOTE INTENTIONS

CRG/BERCI derives vote intentions from two open-ended questions:

- We know that even though, no candidate have been officially declared yet, if the presidential election were held next Sunday for whom would you vote?
- If the legislative elections were held next sunday, for which party would you vote?


The vote figures presented in analysis are calculated after exclusion of the non-respondents.



QUESTIONS

Each graph is preceded by the question asked to respondents, in full, but not in the order they were put to them. All response codes and the weighted and unweighted bases for all demographics can be provided upon request.

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